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Team Decision Theory for Linear Continuous-Time 
Systems 
ARLJNABHA BAGCHI AND TAMER B&AR, SENIOR MEMBER, ~EEE 
Abstmer-W paper develops a team W o n  theory for linear- 
q u a d d c  (LQ) continmns-ttme systems. First, a connterpart of the well- 
h o r n  result of Mer on pnadratic stalk teaols is obtained for two- 
member continrtous-lime LQ static team problems when the statistics of 
the random variables involved are not nemsarily Gaussian. An iterative 
convergent scheme is developed, which in the limit yielaS the optimal team 
~tegies.ForthespedalEaseof~distributlons,theteam-opthnal 
solution is a f f i i  in the lnformatiw available to each DM, and for the 
fmtmspedalcasewbentheteamcostfunctiondoesnotpenalhthe 
~ v a l a e s o f s t a t e , t b e o p t i m a l ~ e s c a n b e o b t a i n e d b y  
solvingaLIapanovtypetime-invariantmatrixeqnation.'Ibissidctheury 
is then exteoded S LQG contirmolls-time dynamic teaols with sampled 
observations under tk one-stepdelay obst?rvtioa sharing patters lEe 
unique solution is again affine in the infomation available to each DM, 
and fmther, it featnres a certaMy-eqdvalem.e property. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Team theory, origmally developed by Radner and Marschak [I], [2], 
has penetrated the control literature through the works of Ho and Chu 
[3], [4]. In particular, a  result of Radner in [2] has attracted attention in 
the control literature, which states that a static, strictly convex linear- 
quadratic Gaussian (LQG) team problem (with  decision  variables  taken 
as vectors in appropriate dimensional  Euclidean  spaces) admits a  unique 
team-optimal  solution that is affine in the observation of each decision 
maker (DM). This result, the so-called Radnefs theorem, has found 
recent applications in the decentralized control of dynamic discretetime 
LQG team problems under the one-stepdelay information sharing pat- 
tern [S]-[A or equivalently under the one-stepdelay observation sharing 
pattern [S, Remark 61. By repeated application of Radner's theorem at 
each stage, it can be shown that such decentralized control problems 
admit affiie solutions which also exhibit some kind of a separation 
property. 
In the  present paper, we develop an analogous theory for continuous- 
time systems. We first derive a counterpart of Radner's theorem for 
two-member  continuous-time linear-quadratic static team problems  when 
the statistics of the random variables  involved are not necessarily Gus- 
sian. Existence and uniqueness of the solution is established, and  it is 
shown that the team-optimal solution satisfies a pair of integral equa- 
tions which can be  solved as the limit of a convergent iterative scheme. 
For the  special case of Gaussian distributions,  however,  the  team-optimal 
solution of the static team  problem is affine in the observation of each 
DM, with the coefficients involved satisfying a pair of linear integral 
equations. It is Mer shown that the solution of these integral equa- 
tions are related to the solution of a  time-invariant matrix equation of 
Liapunov type when the cost  function assigns only terminal quadratic 
wst to the state variables.  Finally, the static theory is extended to LQG 
continuous-time dynamic team  problems  with  discrete  observations, 
under the quasiclassical one-step-delay  observation sharing pattern. The 
unique team-optimal solution is obtained explicitly,  which is again  affine 
in the information available to each DM. 
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11. GENERAL FOR~RTLATION OF THE DYNAWC TZAM PROBLEM 
Let ( x I ,  t > to }  denote an n-dimensional stochastic process satisfying 
the Ito differential equation 
and whose  sample paths are continuous. Here, x. is a Gaussiaa random 
vector with mean Eo and covariance X,, and (wl, t >  t o }  is an n- 
dimensional standard Wiener  process. A(- ) ,  B'(-), E2(-), and F(-) are 
appropriate dimensional matrices with continuous entries on [tO,tf]. 
{ u:, t > to} and { u:, t > to)  are, respectively, rl- and r,dimensional sto- 
chastic processes denoting the controls of DM1 and DM2, respectively. 
The decision  makers  make independent sampled  noisy measurements 
of the state. Spdically, it is assumed that an mi-dimensional  observa- 
tion 
isavailabletoDMiatthesampledtimeinstanttiwherej=O,1;~~,N-1, 
and ro < I ,  < . . - < tN-  I < t N  = r f .  Let us denote the index set of time 
samplesby0={0,1,~~~,N-l}.Then,therandomvectors{u~,jEB,i= 
1,2} are assumed to have independent Gaussian statistics, and with 
o;--N(O, R:), R$ >O, j E 0 ,  i- 1,2. Their statistics are also taken to be 
independent of the Wiener process ( wI, t > to} and the Gaussian vector 
x,. 9. is an observation matrix of appropriate dimensions. 
We now adopt a quasi-chsicd information pattern for this decision 
problem. Specifically, it is assumed that the decisionmakers exchange 
their independent sampled observations with a delay of one sampling 
interval. Such an information pattern is known as the one-step&lay 
obsenvltion sharing partern [SI. 
Mathematidy speaking, the information available to DMi in the 
time  interval 
[$ , t ,+ , )  isqj whereqj={$,6,-,}, 
and Si-' denotes the common information available to the decision 
makers in the same  sampling interval, i.e., 
Let u,! denote the  sigma-algebra  generated  by the information set q:. 
Further, let Hh denote the class of second-order stochastic processes 
{u: ,r>rO),  which satisfy the requirement that their restriction to the 
interval [ti, ti+,) is $-measurable, for all j E 0 .  Then, a permissible 
decision  law  (strategy) for DMi is a mapping y': [ to ,  tf]X W(ml+mz)N+ 
R'J, such that y ' ( . , q ) E H h .  Denote the class of all such  strategies for 
DMi by rh. It should be noted that, for each pair of elements in 
H,$ x Hi, the  stochastic  differential equation (1) admits a unique solu- 
tion whose  sample paths are continuous 191. 
For each {y '  EI',!, y 2  Eri}, we now define the quadratic strictly 
convex wst function for the team (comprised of these two decision 
makers) as 
i=1,2 (4) I 
where Qf > 0, e(-) 0, the latter has continuous entries on [ to,  t,], and 
the expectation operation is taken over the underlying statistics. 
Then, an optimal solution for this continuous-time dynamic team 
problem is a  pair { y lo E r,&, y 2o E ri},  such that 
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Before obtaining the solution of this dynamic team problem, we first 
consider its static version (obtained by setting N= 1) in the next section, 
and then we turn to the more  general  version in Section IV. 
III. STATIC TEAM PROBLEM 
A. A More General Formulation 
In the static version of the dynamic team problem formulated in the 
previous  section,  the  decision  makers make noisy linear observations of 
the random initial state xo, and do not acquire any fur ther  information 
as the decision process proceeds. Hence, the static version can be 
recovered from the previous  general formulation by  simply setting N= 1. 
In this section, we actually first treat a  more  general  version of this static 
problem, in which x. is a second-order random vector  with known (but 
not necessarily Gaussian) statistics, and the static observationy' of DMI 
is not related to x. necessarily in a linear f e o n .  In fact, we only 
assume that the conditional joint probability distribution of (y  ', y 2 )  
given x. is a priori known, but this distribution need not be Gaussian. 
When the information structure of each DM is static in nature, it is 
not necessary to differentiate between a strategy and its realized value 
(control), and hence, hereafter in this section, we will only  consider the 
controls { u:, t 2 to )  and { u:, t > to}  as the decision variables of interest. 
consistent with this adoption, we will investigate the minimkhg solution 
in the product space H: X H: instead of in ri Xr: .  Here, Hi stands, by 
abuse of notation, for the modified  version of H i  (introduced in Section 
II) with N= 1, that also  accoullts for the more general (not necessarily 
Gaussian) statistics introduced above. The same statement applies to r;, 
too. We now introduce an inner product (- - - )i on Hi through the 
relation 
for each  pair (UEH;,  o E H l }  where oEQ, with (Q,%, 9) denoting the 
underlying  probability  space.  Together  with t h i s h e r  product, and for 
each i= 1.2, H;' becomes  a Hilbert space which we simply denote by Hi. 
To complete the formulation of the static team problem,  we let 
h , a t , , t , ] x Q )  denote the space of functions from [ t O , t f ] X B  into R", 
under the inner product 
< x , ~ ) , = ~ ( x r , ( ~ ~ ~ ~ , ( ~ ) + j f ' X , ( w ) ' l ; o d , j .  10 (SO) 
Further, let Q be an operator mapping &ato , t f ]XQ)  into itself, 
defined for each xE&,ato, r f ] x Q )  by 
Then, the static continuous-time quadratic team problem under consid- 
eration in this section is the following. 
Static Team Problem Determine a pair {u" EH',  u2' € H z }  that 
minimizes 
J(u',u2)=<Qx,x),+<u',u')~+(u2,u2)~, (8) 
subject to the constraint (1). 
B. Existence of a Unique Team-Optimal Solution 
The Hilbert space setting formulation given  above leads to a rather 
simple proof of existence and uniqueness of the minimkhg solution 
{ d o ,  uzo}, as well as to a  set of two coupled linear equations that the 
desired  solution satisfies. Let us first  define a Volterra operator (see [lo] 
for a  definition) E': Hi+&,ato,  t,]XQ) by 
( ~ i u ) , ( o ) = ~ ~ ( t , s ) B ' ( s ) u s ( w ) u ! s ,  i=1,2 (93 
where @(t,  s) is a state transition matrix function satisfying 
Further, let rE&,ato, t f ] x 8 )  be defined as 
Then, it is easy to see that, for each {u' EH', u2 € H z } ,  the unique 
solution of (1) can be written as 
Xf = ( e , u ' ) , ( w ~ + ( r ; u 2 ) , ( o ) + ~ , ( w ~ ,  t> to t  (10) 
which,  when substituted in (8), yields the following  equivalent  expression 
for J 
J(u',uZ)=(Q(elu'+~u2+r),~1u'+~uZ+r), 
+<u' ,u ' ) l+(u~,u2)2 .  (11) 
We  now  have 
and only if, it satisfies the pair of equations 
 emm ma I :  A pair ( d o  EH', 2' E H Z )  is a minimising solution if, 
where ef denotes the adjoint of e'. 
PrmJ Since J is  continuously differentiable and strictly  convex on 
H' X Hz ,  every  person-by-person optimal solution is also team-optimal, 
and  furthemore, the first-order conditions are also sufficient.  Hence, the 
result follows by taking the Gateaux variations of J separately with 
respect to u' and u2, and by setting them equal to zero. 0 
The following lemma now proves existence and uniqueness of the 
mhimizhg solution. 
Lemma 2: The pair of equations (12) admits a  unique  solution. 
Proof: Let us first note that (12) can also be written as 
where e: H' X H Z + L z f a t 0 , ~ , ] X Q )  is defined as e=(&,&), and Z is 
the identity operator mappmg H' X H2 into itself. Then, it readily 
follows that (12) admits a unique solution if, and only if, (Z+e*Qe) is 
invertible.  Now,  since e, is a  Volterra operator, it is completely  continu- 
ous (i.e., compact) [lo], and so is its adjoint Ef . This implies that L? and 
e* are also compact. Furthermore, Q is a bounded operator. Since the 
product of compact and bounded operators is compact [lo], it now 
follows that e*Qk!is compact,  which is also self-adjoint and nonnegative. 
This, then, implies that the operator (Z+E*Qe) is indeed invertiile, 
since it is the s u m  of an identity operator (with is strongly  positive) and a 
nonnegatiw self-adjoint compact operator. 17 
C. Functional  Equations for the Team-Optimal Solution 
We now seek to obtain, as an equivalent counterpart of (12), a set of 
functional (iitegral) equations that the team-optimal solution should 
satis@. To this end,  we s t a r t  with the operator form (12) and f i i  rewrite 
those equations as 
where xo denotes the optimal team trajectory. By utilizing certain 
standard properties of adjoint operators, we can show (see [22, Appendix 
ID that has the functional form 
efz'=v', i=1,2, 
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where 
~~(w)=I~~B~(~)'O(S,~)'E[Z~(~)~U~] dF+Bi(t) ' ( t , , i ) 'E[z; , (o) lui]  
f 
(15) 
and u' stands for the sigma-algebra generated by the information set of 
DMi.  This result,  together  with  some routine, but cumbersome,  manipu- 
lations applied to (14), leads to the following  result,  whose  proof can be 
found in [22]. 
 heo or em I: The unique optimal solution {u'"EH~, U ~ O E  H Z )  of the 
static team problem  satisfies, and is the unique solution  of, the following 
pair of coupled  integral  equations: 
U:"=Bl(t)' ( S1(t)  1, 'B1(t,s)B1(s)B1(s)~~~dF-i~) (16a) 
u : o = ~ ( t ) '  (s2(t) I, fB2( t ,s )B2(s )B2(s ) ' I :dF- i : j  ( l a )  
where Si(t) ,  i= 1,2 are the unique nonnegative definite matrix function 
solutions of the Riccati equations 
~'(t)=-A(f)'S'(f)-S'(t)A(i)-Q(r)+S'(r)B'(t)B'(i)'S'(r), 
Si( i,) = Q, ; (174 
W ( t ,  s), i=  1,2, are the state transition matrices for the systems 
i = ( A ( t ) - B ' ( f ) B ' ( t ) ' S ' ( t ) ) x ;  
and 
Ij=S'(t)  O ( t , t o ) E [ x o ( w ) l o ' ]  { 
+ p q i , s ) B q s ) E [  u:'o(w)lo'] dY) +k:, (1%) 
i # j ;   i , j =  1,2 
where kf, i=  1,2, satisfy 
i f (o)=-(A( t ) ' -S ' ( t )B' (r )B' (r ) ' )k: (o) -S' (r )BJ(r)E[  u{"(o) ld]  
k;,(w)=O; j + i , j ~ { I , 2 } .  (17c) 
When the underlying  statistics are not Gaussian, it is, in general, quite 
difficult to solve the pair of equations (16) mainly because of the 
presence of conditional expectations. One can, however, obtain the 
solution as the  limit of a  convergent  sequence of iterations,  by  means of 
what is known as the infinite second  guessing  technique [l 1L [12]: 
% Infinite Second Guessing A i g o r i f h  
1) Start with any u2 € H z ,  substitute this in (16a), and solve the 
2) Substitute this u1 EH' into (16b) and solve for the corresponding 
3) Use the solution of (16b) obtained at step 2 to replace the starting 
Proposition I: 
1) In the preceding  algorithm, the corresponding linear integral equa- 
tions at each step admit a  unique  solution. 
2) Regardless of the initial  choice, the infinite second  guessing  algo- 
rithm converges to the unique optimal solution. 
Proof: First note that, for each u2 eH2, (16a) constitutes a neces- 
sary and sufficient condition for Y' EH' to minimize J(u', u 2 )  over HI. 
Likewise,  (16b)  provides a necessary and sufficient condition for minimi- 
zation of J(ul, u2) over H 2 ,  for each  fixed u' EH' .  Hence, the proposi- 
tion readily follows, since J is continuously differentiable and strictly 
convex on H' X H 2  and it has a unique minimum (Lemmas 1 and 2). 0 
resulting equation for the corresponding u1 E H'.  
u2 EH2. 
choice at step 1, and reiterate. 
D. The Speciat Cme of Gaussian Stafktics 
When the underlying statistics are Gaussian, it is possible to determine 
the structure of the  team-optimal controls explicitly, To this end, and  in 
view  of the formulation of the general  problem in Section II, let 
xo-N(Fo, 2,) and the observation y' of DMi be  given as 
y'=C'x,+o', i= 1,2 (18) 
where q-N(O, R'), R'>O, and these three random vectors are statisti- 
cally  independent.  Now,  consider the iterative algorithm of the previous 
subsection, starting at step 1  with u2=0 a s .  Then, the resulting  expres- 
sion for uj is 
u: = - B ~ ( i ) ' s ' ( r ) ~ ' ( f , t , ) E [ X , I u ' ]  (19) 
so that u: is really  a linear function of E[xolu'],  which, in turn, is affine 
in y ' because of the underlying Gaussian statistics. 
Now, if this functional form is substituted in ( l a ) ,  at step 2, it follows 
through a similar argument (but this time via the solution of a linw 
differential equation) that the solution u: will be affine in y2, again 
because of Gaussian  statistics. This argument then iteratively  yields (also 
in view of Proposition 1) the conclusion that, when the underlying 
statistics are Gaussian, the unique team-optimal  solution is affine in the 
information available to each DM. We  have, in fact,  the following. 
Theorem 2: The  continuous-time  two-member LQG static team prob- 
lem formulated in this section admits the unique solution 
u ~ o ~ ~ ' ( r ) [ y ~ - C ' ~ o ] - B ' ( t ) ' S ( t ) 4 ( t , f o ) f o  m a )  
~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ ( i ) [ y ~ - C ~ F ~ ] - B ~ ( ~ ) ' S ( r ) + ( f , t ~ ) ~ ~  ab) 
where S(r), io < t < i,, is the unique nonnegative definite matrix function 
solution of the  Riccati equation 
S ( r ) + ~ ( r ) ' ~ ( r ) + ~ ( t ) ~ ( t ) - ~ ( t ) [ ~ ' ( f ) ~ l ( ~ ) ' + ~ 2 ( t ) ~ 2 ( f ) ' ]  
S(r)+Q(t)=O, S( t , )=Qf*  (21) 
Y( t ,  s) is the state transition matrix function satisfying 
-= [A( ' ) - [B' (r )B' ( t ) '  
dt 
+ B 2 ( r ) B 2 ( t ) ' ] S ( t ) ] B ( i , s )  + ( s , s ) = I .  (22) 
The pair {P'(*), P 2 ( . ) )  satisfies (and constitutes the unique solution for) 
the coupled  set of integral  equations 
P' (~ )=B~( r ) 'S l ( r ) l ' + ' ( t , s )B ' (s )B ' (s ) 'L ' (s )L -B ' ( t ) 'L ' ( r )  
' 0  
( W  
PZ(r)=BZ(t)'s2(r)jf+2(t,S)B2(S)B2(s)IL2(S)dF--B2(f).L2(i) 
10 
(Ub) 
where 
L ' ( t ) = ~ ' ( f ) { e ( i , r , ) + I ; : o ( r , s ) B ~ ( s ) p j o d s  1 X'+K'(t), 
i# j  i , j=1,2 (24a) 
and 
K ' ( t ) =  -(A(t)'-Si(t)B'(t)B'(t)')Ki(i)-S'(r)Bi(t)Pi(t)c'Zi, 
i # j ;   i , j =  1,2 (24b) 
and 
L'=20"'(C'20Ci'+R')-1, i=1,2. (25) 
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Proof: A proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix. 0 
We obtain extremely  simple  expressions for  the optimal uso, i= 1,2, in 
the special case when Q(t)=O, i.e., if no cost is assigned to  the inter- 
mediate  values of the state vector. 
Corollary: For the continuous-time two-member LQG static team 
problem formulated in this don, and with Q(.) taken to vanish 
identically  on  the interval [to, t,], the  unique minimkhg solution is 
ufo= - B ' ( t ) ' K ( t ) B ( t , t o ) D ' o [ ~ ' - C ' ~ ~ ] - B ' ( ~ ) ' S ( t ) ~ ( t , ~ o ) j s ,  
(264 
u : o = - B ~ ( ~ ) ' K ( t ) B ( t , t o ) D ~ 0 [ y ~ - C ~ ~ o ] - B ~ ( t ) ' S ( t ) ~ ( t , t , ) ~ o ,  
where Dlo uniquely satisfies the Lyapunov-type  matrix equation 
(z+M')D'o-M~(z+M~)-'M'D'oC'Z~=Z'-M~(I+M~)-LZ~C2Z' 
(27a) 
and D20 is given  by 
D2°=(z+M2)-'(22-M'D'oC'Z2). (2%) 
Here, M i  is a constant matrix defmed  by 
~'=~~(to,s)~'(s)Bi(s)'~(s)@(s,ro)dr, i=1,2  (27~) 
Proof: Details are given  in [22]. 0 
E. Minimum Team Cost Under Gaussian Sratistia 
We now obtain an expression for the minimum value of the cost 
function of the static LQG team  problem  solved in the  previous subsee  
tion. The results to be derived in the  sequel wil especially be useful in 
the derivation of the  optimal  solution of the  dynamic LQG team prob- 
lem  in  Section IV. 
Let )I.I) denote the standard norm on an appropriate dimensional 
Lemma 3: The cost function J ,  defined by (4), can equivalently be 
. Euclidean space. Then, we first have 
written as 
~ ( u ' , u 2 ) = ~ " ~ { ~ l u ~ + ~ ' ( r ~ ~ ( t ) x , ~ ~ ~ + l l u ~ + ~ ~ ( t ~ ~ ( t ) x , 1 ~ 2 } d t  
10 
+ZAS(0)jTo +Jr (28a) 
where S(-)  is defined  by (22) and J, is given  by 
J, = Tr( ZOS(O)) + Tr "S( t)F(t)F( t)'& (io ) ( a b )  
and is independent of the  controls. 
Proof: This result  follows  from the  standard "completing the square" 
argument of LQ stochastic control [13] by appropriate decomposition. 0 
Now, to obtain an expression  for the minimum team cost, it will be 
sufficient to substitute the optimal team solution  given  in Theorem 2 into 
J .  If this is done, then  the integral term in (2Sa) reads 
~ ~ { I I P ' ( ~ ) [ ~ ' - c ~ F ~ I + B ~ ( ~ ~ s ( ~ ) [ ~ ~ - ~ ( ~ , ~ ~ ) ~ ~ J ~ ~ ~  
+ ~ ~ P 2 ( t ) [ ~ 2 - C 2 j T o J + B 2 ( t ) ' S ( t ) [ ~ ~ - ~ ( f , t o ) Z ~ ] ~ ~ 2 } d ~  (29  
where x:, t > to, denotes  the optimal team  trajectory and is determined 
as the unique solution of 
dxp=[A( t )xp+B' ( f )u :o+B2( t )u :o ]d t+F( t )dw , ,  xfo=xo.  
(30) 
Let us now decompose x: into two parts  and write it as x: =m, +E,  
where m, and t,, respectively,  satisfy 
-_ dm, -A( t )m,  - [ ~ ' ( t ) ~ ' ( t ~ + ~ 2 ( t ) ~ ~ o r k ( t ,  to)mo, 
dt 
mo =Fo (31a) 
d ~ , = A ( t ) ~ , d t - ( B ' ( ~ ) P ' ( t ) [ ~ ' - C ' ~ ~ ]  
+B2(t)p2(r)[y2-c2z o ] ) d t + F ( t ) d ~ , ,  &=xO-Zo,. (31b) 
The solution of  (31a) can readily be obtained as 
m, =9(t. t o ) 5  
where #( t ,s )  is defined by (22). Then, if the decomposition x; = 
+(t, to)%, +& is used in (29), the  resulting  expression  becomes  only a 
function of the  stochastic  process {t,, t > to) ,  Le., it can be written as 
~ ~ { I I P ~ ( ~ ) [ C ~ ~ , + ~ ' ] + B ~ ( I ) ' S ( ~ ) ~ , I ~ ~  
+IIP2(t)[C2[o+u2]+B2(t)'S(t) .&l12}dt.  (32) 
This expression can further be simplified by making use of the solution 
of  (31b) and the  statistical independence  property of to, u' and 0'. The 
f i i  form is given  below as the second term of expression  (34) and  the 
result is summarjzed in Lemma 4. The details of the manipulations 
involved to arrive at expression (34) will not be given here since they are 
rather  straightfornard (although  cumbersome) and not that interesting 
for our purposes. What is important to note is the structure of the 
minimum value (as a function of 4 )  given in Lemma 4. 
Preliminary N o W n  for Lemma 4: 
Define the appropriate dimensional matrix functions Ai(-), Ai(-), 
A!(.),  A:(-), A%.), A%*) on [ to.  9 1  as 
A;(t)=P'(t)C'+B'(t)'S(t)@(t,t,) 
- B ' ( t ) ' S ( t ) ~ f @ ( t . s ) B i ( s ) ~ i ( s ) d r C i  
t0  
-B'( t ) 'S( t ) / 'o( t ,s)Bys)pj(s)drC' ,  
Io 
izj, i ,  j =  1,2. (33a) 
A~( t )=P' ( f )+B' ( f ) 'S ( t ) l 'B( t , s )B ' ( s )P ' ( s )dr ;  i=1,2, 
t0  
(33b) 
A~(t)=B'( t ) 'S(f) l 'B(t ,s)B'(s)P'(s)dF; i+j,  i ,j=1,2. 
IO 
(33c) 
Further, let 
J , = J , + T r  (Ab(t)'Ai(t)+A2,(t).a2,(t))Zo i:f 
+ ( ~ : ( t ) ' ~ : ( t ) + a : ( t ) ' ~ ~ ( t ) ) R '  
+(A:( t)'n:( t )  +a',( t)'a;( t ) ) ~ *  
+S(t)'(B'(t)B'(t)'+B2(t)BZ(t)')S(t) 
-i?(t, c)F(T)F(T)'@(~, T ) ' ~ T  dt. I (34) 
L.em 4: The minimum value of the cost function of the static LQG 
team problem  under consideration is 
Jo : J(u'o,u20)=qS(o)zo+Jm (35) 
where J, is given  by (34) and is independent of -To. 0 
1158 IEEe TRANSACIIONS ON AUTObfATIC CONTROL, VOL AC-25, NO. 6, DECEMBER 1980 
N. SOLUTION OF THE DYNAMIC TEAM PROBLaM 
The solution of the dynamic LQG team problem formulated in Sec- 
tion  I1 can now  be obtained by making use of the static theory  devel- 
oped in the previous  section. The derivation basically  involves  a  dynamic 
programming  type of argument, and one has to utilize Theorem 2 and 
Lemma 4 at every sampling time interval. In the sequel, this wil be 
achieved  by  first  enlarging the strategy spaces of the decisionmakers so 
as to formulate a new team problem  whose  team-optimal solution can be 
obtained more  readily, and then by relating the solution of the original 
team problem to the one obtained for  the auxiliary  one.  Such an indirect 
derivation seems to be inevitable, since otherwise the analysis gets quite 
cumbersome. 
The only difference between the new dynamic team problem to be 
introduced and the original one lies in the information patterns. Specifi- 
cally,-the  new one is defined by  replacing q; and 8,- I ,  given  by  (3),  by i j j  
and 8,-1, respectively,  where 
Under this new information pattern, the decision makers have also 
access to each other's control values used during all past sampling 
intepals. It should be noted that this information pattern is not the 
continuous-time counterpart of the one-stepdelay information sharing 
pattern [14] and, the way it stands, it is not of much practical impor- 
tance.  It,  however,  provides mathematical convenience in obtaining the 
solution of the original team  problem, as it will become  clear  later. 
Under this new info-rmation pattern, let us replace the strategy spaces 
r,!, and ri  by r,!, and ri, respectively,  where the latter are defined in an 
analogous way, but under the new information pattern. Since the new 
strategy spaces are larger, we immediately have the inequality 
(37) 
i.e., the minimum c a t  of the new team problem  provides  a  lower bound 
for the minimum c a t  of the o r i d  one. The following  lemma  now says 
that, in fact, they  have to be the same. 
Lemma 5: 
1) TO every  pair (~'EF,&, ~zEF;}, there corresponds a  unique  pair 
2) The inequality in (37) is, in fact, an equality. 
{y1Er,!,,y2Eri) so that J( f1 , f2 )=~(y1 ,yZ) .  
Proof: 1) For each {flerL, f2El?i), the implicit equations' 
can be solved recursively for (uj(w),j=N-l,-..,O;i=1,2) as fun0 
tionsof {qj,j=N-l,.--,O;i=1,2)becauseofthenatureoftheinfor- 
mation pattern. Then, the resulting functional relations  provide  a  pair in 
rL xr;, and a unique one since the stochastic differential equation (1) 
admits a unique  solution in each sampling  interval. 
2) This result  follows  readily from 1). n 
Remark I :  There, in fact, exist uncountably many pairs in f,!, Xf$ 
corresponding to a  given  pair in r,!, x r;; equivalently, a pair of strate 
gies under the original information structure has several rcprmentutions 
[15] under the new (enlarged) information pattern. Hence,  Lemma  5  also 
says that all representations of a minimizing solution  pair for the original 
team problem, and those  only  solve the new team problem. In the sequel, 
we will obtain one such representation which is, in fact, the  simplest one 
to derive; and then we solve implicit equations of the type (38) to obtain 
the desired optimal team solution. 0 
An Awciliruy Result: In the derivation of optimal solution for the 
new team problem, we will need the expressions for if, E[xt,l& I ]  
and cov(if,, if,), which  we first obtain. To this end, let us first introduce 
a stochastic process { z t ,  r > r o )  and a deterministic matrix function X(-) 
on [ to ,  ',I by 
- = A ( f ) z f + B ' ( t ) u ~ + B 2 ( t ) u ~ .  &f Zf,,=X0 
dr 
r j - ,< t<t i ,  j=l ; . . ,N.  
zf ,=ztr+Ki[yi-cjzf , - ]  
where 
It should  be noted that the  matrix X(.), as well as the sample paths of 
{z f ,  r > r O } ,  have discontinuities at the sampling points t l , - - - ,  t N - - .  
Now, we have the following result. 
Lemma 6: 
Proof: Relations (39)-(40) (without the term B'u: +B2u:)  con- . 
stitute the filtering equations for linear continuous-time systems with 
discrete (sampled)  observations [16]. Inclusion of the term B'u; +B2u: 
in (39) is possible (as in the standard LQG control theory)  because of the 
nature of the information pattern involved.  Specifically, zf = 
E[x,lG,-,; u:,u: ,s<r]  for t j - ,  G r < r i ,  and zI,=E[xfJIG,] ,  and Z(r)= 
cov(z,,z,). Equations (42a) and (42b) then readily follow from these 
relations in light of (36b). 0 
Dencurion of an Optimal Solution for the New T a m  Problem 
We  now seek to obtain a  solution for the  optimization problem 
and 
x?- i 
we note that J can be written in the equivalent form 
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where the second  term does not depend on the restriction  of {?I, U2) to 
the sampling  interval [ I ~ - ~ ,  IN). Hence, to determine {?Ao- 7;- I}, we 
can confine our attention to the f i t  term of (43c),  which  we may denote 
by J N - l  where we define, in genaal, 
j =  N- 1,- -. ,O. (44) 
That is, first  conditioned on the common information S;- available to the 
decisionmakers in the sampling interval [ti, t,.+ I ) ,  and then full expecta- 
$on. Now, note that the probability distriiution of conditioned on 
is Gaussian (because of hear state dynamics and linear observa- 
tion equations) and furtheamore, it has mean it,,-, and covariance 
Z(t;-l) by Lemma 6. Then, the team problem defined by JN-' b e  
comes  equivalent to the static LQG team problem of Section III-D, with 
only to replaced by t N - ] ,  Fo by &N-,,  Zo by Z(t;-l) and  C'by CA-]. 
Consequently, the result of Theorem 2 directly applies here, implying 
that the solution will be given  by 
where (F'(-),?'(-)} wil be given by a pair of equations, which is a 
counterpart of (23). 
Now, if this solution is substituted into JN-' ,  we know from Lemma 4 
that it will have  the functional form 
where the second term is given as a counterpart of (34) and does not 
depend on the past controls (or  strategies). Furthermore, replacing 
in the preceding  expression  by i,,-, we can express its 
first term as 
which is equivalent to 
using standard properties of conditional mean.  Hence,  while  determining 
the pair ii-z}, the expression of interest is [also from (43~11 
since E(.) is independent of the controls. But, this team problem is 
analogous to the one considered on the sampling interval [ tN- , , tN) ,  
thereby admitting a solution in the structural form (45). Prcceeding in 
this manner, we obtain, by induction, the following  proposition. 
Pre@imny notation for Proposition 2: 
Let X$ be appropriate dimensional matrices defined  by 
Let ?I(-), iz(.) be piecewise continuous functions on [to, t,], which 
satisfy the coupled set of linear integral equations 
i ' ( r ) - B l ( t y s ' ( r ) l ' ~ ( f , s ) B ~ ( s ) B ~ ( s ) ~ ~ ~ ( ~ ) d p - B ~ ( : ) ' ~ ~ ( t )  
i ~ ( r ) = B 2 ( t y s 2 ( t ) ~ ' ~ ( t , S ) B 2 ( S ) B Z ( s y ~ ~ ( S ) d p - - B Z ( t ) ' ~ ~ ( t )  
'J 
(5% 
.ti<t<t,+,,j=O,l,...,N-l (50b) 
where 
i j ( t ) = & I )  @ ( t  t . ) +  @ ( t , s ) B k ( s ) i k ( s ) & q  5$;.k.(t) [ ' I  1; I 
(514 
and 
&t)- - ( A ( t ) ' - s ' ( t ) B ' ( t ) B ' ( ~ y ) ~ ~ ( t ) - S ' ( t ) B k ( t ) ~ k ( r ) ~ & 5 ~  
kj(r,+l)=O, i#k,  i,k=1,2, j a  ( 5 W  
where b (  t ) satisfies 
s ' ( t ) - -A ( t ) 'S ' ( t ) -S i ( t )A ( t ) -Q( t )+s i ( f )B i ( t )B i ( t ) '~ ( t ) ,  
t i - ] < t < t j ,  Si( t i )=S(t i ) ,  i=1,2, j = N , . - - , I ,  (51c) 
while 
Ti( I ,  s) is the state transition matrix of the system 
x=(A( t ) -Bi ( t )Bi ( t ) ' s ' ( t ) )x ,  t E  [ t i , t i+J ,  i=1,2, j e .  
Pq@tion,2: 1) The set of equations (50) admits a unique solution 
pair {PI(.), Pz(-)}. 2) The LQG dynamic team problem of Section 11, 
and under the amended information structure ({I, iZ), admits an opti- 
mal solution whose restriction to the sampling interval [ t,, t,+ is 
i'O((t,il)=?l(t)[~~-~li,,]-E1(t~S(t)J/(t,ti)i,, (5h) 
~ z 0 ( ~ , ~ 2 ) = ~ 2 ( t ) [ ~ z - ~ z i t , ] - B Z ( t ) ' S ( t ) ~ ( t , t i ) i ~ ,  (52b) 
t j < t < I i + l ,  j=O,-*- ,N- l .  
Proofr 1) This result  readily  follows from Theorem 2, since the pair 
of equations (SO) on each sampling interval is analogous to the pair (23). 
2) The inductive argument for derivation of this optimal solution has 
already been outlined prior to the statement of this proposition. 0 
It should  be noted that we cannot claim  uniqueness of the solution 
presegted  above, in view of Remark 1. In fact, all pairs of strategies in 
ri xr$ that provide the same minimum value for J will be different 
representations of {f", fzo}. One such representation will, however,  lie 
in rk x r;, which will constitute the  unique  solution of the original team 
problem  by Lemma 5. This particular representation is given  below in 
Theorem 3. 
Theorem 3: The LQG dynamic team problem of Section 11, and 
under the onestepdelay observation sharing pattern as formulated 
there, admits the  unique  solution  (in rh xr;) whose  restriction to the 
sampling interval [ti, t,+ is given as 
y lo ( t ,  q l ) = i ~ ( t ) [  -qlii] - ~ l ( t ) p ~ ( t ) + ( t ,  t,>Z (53a) 
yZo(~,q2)=~Z(f)[~~-~z~i]-~z(f~S(t)~(f,ti)~,, (53b)
t j < t < r i + l ,  j=O,- - - ,N- l  
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where ij is defined as 
ij =zo(t; 1, j E e  (54) 
where z o ( t )  is the solution of (39) with uf replaced by yiO(t, vi). 0 
Proof: This result is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2 
and Lemma 5, since (53) indeed exists by recursively solving the dif- 
ferential equation (39), and it is clearly an element of rk x r i .  0 
Remurk 2: Since I)(-, .) is the fundamental matrix corresponding to 
the feedback system of the deterministic version of the problem, it 
should  be  clear  from  (53) that the optimal solution of the dynamic team 
problem  features  a certaintyequivalence property.  The  second  terms in 
(59 yield  exactly  the  solution of the deterministic version of the problem 
if 6, is replaced by x ( t j ) .  The first  terms, on the other hand, reflect the 
contribution of the nonshared part of the information to each DM's 
strategy, i.e., they are the innovation terms. 0 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a complete solution to the LQG 
continuous-time  two-member  team  problem, in which the decision- 
makers  make independent noisy  measurements of the state at sampled 
instants of time, and exchange this information with a delay of one 
sampling  interval. The optimal team  solution is affine in the information 
available to each  DM, and the coefficient  terms  involved are determined 
recursively and by solving a pair of integral equations at each step. It is 
shown that, under certain conditions, the solutions of these integral 
equations can be obtained by solving Liapunov type timeinvariant 
The delayed observation sharing pattern considered in this paper 
within the context of continuous-time dynamic teams seems to be a 
natural counterpart of the discrete-time onestep delayed observation 
sharing pattern [8]. Other types of delayed information sharing patterns 
for continuous-time  systems  have  recently been considered in the litera- 
ture, notably in [ 181 and [ 191. The former article is devoted to decentral- 
ized control of Gauss-Poisson processes, in which case each DM instan- 
taneously  observes the jumps occurring in his  own system  dynamics but 
transmits this information to the other DM'S with a certain amount of 
delay. 
The latter reference  formulates  a  general  decentralized LQ team 
problem and also makes use of techniques of functional analysis (in 
particular, properties of Volterra operators) in arriving at certain general 
conclusions. The general  model of [19]  is,  however,  restricted  consider- 
ably by the assumption that the state and information variables are 
unaffected by the controls of the DM's; hence, it is basically static in 
character. Our static team problem  considered in Section 111 can defi- 
nitely be viewed as a  special  case of this general  model,  but  [19]  does not 
contain the explicit optimal team solution presented in this paper and, 
furthermore, it does not discuss the existence and uniqueness  questions 
thoroughly  investigated in this paper. 
One natural (although not straightforward) extension of the results of 
this paper would be to obtain Nash equilibria of similarly structured 
stochastic nonzero-sum differential game  problems. For a counterpart of 
Lemma 2 to be valid in that case, one has to impose certain additional 
restrictions on the parameters of the problem. This has actually been 
done in [a] where authors obtain a sufficient condition for the LQG 
nonzero-sum differential game to admit a unique Nash equilibrium 
solution under static information. For the dynamic continuous-time 
LQG  nonzero-sum  differential  game, and under the  one-step-delay o b  
servation sharing pattern of this paper, Nash equilibria wiU again be 
unique whenever it exists, and the equilibrium strategies of the d e  
cisionmakers (players) will be affine in their information, i.e., a direct 
counterpart of the result of [21] wil hold true for the continuous-time 
problem also. A verification of this result, however, will require an 
analysis quite different from the one employed in Section iv of this 
paper, since Lemma 5 has no counterpart in a game situation.  Details of 
this analysis, as well as the expressions for the unique equilibrium 
strategies, will be presented in a forthcoming paper. 
matrix equations. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 2: We first assume that xo= 0. With the Gaussian 
asSumPtiO% 
~ [ x ~ l ~ ' ] = ~ [ x ~ y " l ( ~ [ y ' y ' ' ~ ) - L y ' = Z ' y ' ,  i= 1,2 
where X' is given by expression (25). From the discussion prior to the 
statement of Theorem 2, we see that, when Zo=O, the optimal ufo are 
bear functions of y', i =  1,2. n u s ,  we can write uT=P( t ) y '  Where 
P ' ( f )  are to be determined.  Using this form in (16a) and (I&), we get 
(23a) and (23b). An obvious iterations scheme is to start with P2(r)E0,  
determine P' ( f ) ,  and iterate. The iteration converges on account of the 
convergence of the  second  guessing  scheme.  We now want to extend this 
result to the case when Zo#O. For this, we first  take another look at the 
criterion. The system state evolves according to (1) and the criterion to 
be minimized is (4). Let 
B ( t ) = [ B ' ( t ) , B 2 ( r ) l ,  
u , = [ ; ; ]  and S( t )  be the unique  solution of the Riccati equation 
~ ( f ) + A ( t ) ~ S ( f ) + S ( t ) ~ ( t ) + Q ( f ) - ~ ( f ) B ( f ) B ( f ) ~ S ( f ) = O ,  
S(tf)'Q,. 
Then J can be  expressed in an alternate form 
J = E [  J ' i l ~ , + B ( r ~ S ( r ) x , , i ' d t + ~ " t r S ( t ) F ( i ) ~ ( f ~ d t + x ~ S ~ o ) ~ o ] .  10 0 
This follows  from the standard completion of squares argument [ 131 (see 
Lemma  3).  Since  only the first  term depends on u, , the solution obtained 
is also the solution for  the team problem  with the criterion 
i=Ejr'llU,+B(r)'S(t)x,112dl. 
I O  
We  now study  the  case  when xo#O. The observationsyi=Cixo+oi may 
be converted into zero  mean quantities by defining 
v " ~ y ' - ~ ' ~ o ~ ~ ' ( ~ o - ~ o ) + o ' ,  i=1,2. 
Let x, be the unique solution of 
i , = A ( t ) x ~ + B ( r ) u , ,  xfo=xo. 
u , + B ( r ~ s ( t ) ~ I = u , + B ( f ) ' S ( f ) ~ ~ @ ( t , s ) l ( s ) u , d s  
Then, 
I O  
+B(fyS(t)@(t,ro)50. 
Let 
i,=u,-m(r)wherem(t)isyettobechosen.Then, 
u , + B ( t y s ( r ) ~ , = 1 ; , + ~ ( t )  
+B(f)'S(f)~r~(~,s)B(s)[i,+m(s)]ds+B(t)'S(f)O(f,fo)~o. 
10 
choose m ( t )  so that 
m ( r ) + B ( t ) ~ s ( t ) j ' o ( t , s ) B ( s ) m ( s ) ~ =  - ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ r , r o ~ ~ o .  
I O  
We can solve this integral equation in m ( t )  to obtain 
\k(t,s)B(s)B(s)'S(s)O(s,to)dr x, 1 
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where q ( t ,  s) is the fundamental matrix for the system 
i = ( A ( t ) - B ( t ) B ( t ) ' S ( t ) ) x .  
Then, clearly 
Q ( r ,  t o ) - J f * ( r ,  s p ( s ) ~ ( s p ( s ) ~ ( s ,  to )  cir=q(t, t o )  
f 0  
and 
m ( t ) =  -B(t)'S(t)i(t,t0)Zo. 
With lit as the  decision  vector, we may  write 
where 
'f0 
and 
rit,=A(t)z,dt+B*(t)l?:di+B~(t)li:dr+F(t)dw,, 
Z , ~ = X O - - ~ T O  with E[z f0 ]=O.  
But this is the -tion problem  with zero mean  initial  condition, 
which  has  already been solved. In fact,  the  optimal  solution is 
I j ;=P( t )y ' ,  i= 1,2 
where P'(t), i= 1,2, satisfy  the pair (23a),  (23b). This yields 
s;=P'(t)[y'-cC'-lTo]+m'(t) 
where we have split m ( t )  as [ :::::I. w e  have,  then, 
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An Adaptive &Step Ahead Predictor Based on Least 
squares 
KWAI SANG SIN, GRAHAM C. GOODWIN, AND 
ROBERT R. BITMEAD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing literature on the question of convergence of 
recursive  algorithms for parameter  estimation in time series models; see, 
for example, 141-[8]. In most of this work, the emphasis has been on 
establishing consistency and other asymptotic properties for the esti- 
mated  parameters. 
In [l] an alternative approach was described in which emphasis was 
placed on the  performance of a predictor  designed using the estimated 
parameters rather than the properties of the  estimated  parameters  them- 
selves. The advantages of this approach are that it is not neceSSary to 
consider  the  predictor performance as a  separate  issue and it is possible 
to weaken  the  assumptions on the  model and experimental conditions. 
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